Proposals differ in scope, judicial selection methods and term lengths. Some are draft provisions; others remain declarations.
01 / COMPARISON
What do the different groups propose?
PROPOSAL 01
Senate draft · paper No. 55 / 2024
A constitutional amendment concerning the Tribunal
The draft would end the terms of existing judges, introduce a four-year cooling-off period for people who held specified political positions and set three-year terms for the Tribunal president and vice-president. It also addresses constitutional review by courts.
What to keep in mind
The draft allows specific provisions to be assessed. It is not current law and should not be equated with the current position of every party that supported reform efforts in 2024.
A broader reset: the Tribunal, Supreme Court and National Council of the Judiciary
Konfederacja’s published proposal calls for a constitutional amendment ending the existing memberships of the Constitutional Tribunal, Supreme Court and National Council of the Judiciary (KRS), allowing them to be reconstituted under new rules.
What to keep in mind
A declaration of the direction of reform. The cited announcement does not include a full constitutional amendment, transitional rules or every selection procedure. Details from other proposals are not automatically attributed to it.
The 7–5–3 model: selection shared by three institutions
The analysis of 28 September 2026 proposes a 15-member Tribunal: seven judges elected by the Sejm, five by the Senate and three by the president. Initial terms would last five or nine years, followed by nine-year terms. The author proposes a four-year cooling-off period for politicians, a three-year term for the Tribunal president, and retirement of the existing membership. Experts would draft the reform, followed by consultation.
What to keep in mind
An expert proposal, not enacted legislation or a joint party position. Sharing appointments is intended to prevent one political camp from dominating; its effectiveness is a prediction, not a guarantee. The report allows certain previously elected individuals who never began adjudicating to stand again; it does not establish a general right of re-election for all judges.
The 5–5–5 model and independent publication of judgments
The proposal presented in May 2026 assigns five selections each to the Sejm, Senate and president. It retains nine-year terms and the ban on re-election. Judges would take their oath before the institution selecting them. The Tribunal president would publish judgments. Existing terms would end, while future judges would remain in office until their successors took over.
What to keep in mind
A proposal by one senator, not automatically the position of the entire PSL. This description follows the published account and reproduced draft. It differs from Zalasiński’s 7–5–3 model. Giving publication responsibility to the president addresses the risk of blocked publication, but does not resolve every dispute over judicial composition.
12 judges, a three-fifths majority and a 100-day deadline
On 7 October 2026, Krzysztof Szczucki presented proposals to retire the existing membership during the next Sejm term, elect 12 judges by a three-fifths majority and introduce 12-year terms. Initial terms of one to 12 years would be allocated by lot. Failure to elect within 100 days would allow the president to shorten the Sejm’s term. The plan includes a four-year political cooling-off period and oaths before the president.
What to keep in mind
Proposals presented at a press conference, not current law. Lots would determine the length of initial terms. The power to shorten the Sejm’s term is proposed as a safeguard against deadlock, but would also expand presidential powers.
A new membership elected by a constitutional majority
After consultations with the president on 31 October 2026, Adrian Zandberg proposed ending the tenure of all current Tribunal judges, amending the Constitution and electing a new membership by a constitutional majority. He argued this would prevent a single party from filling the Tribunal on its own and declared willingness to talk to all political forces.
What to keep in mind
A political declaration reported by RMF24/PAP. The cited statement does not contain a complete reform text, a procedure for electoral deadlock or detailed transitional provisions. Solutions from other parties’ proposals are not attributed to it.
On 31 October 2026, Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz reiterated support for a constitutional reset. His stated aims were restoring trust in the Tribunal, judicial independence and ending challenges to judgments. He published his position after consultations with the president.
What to keep in mind
A statement of objectives, not a detailed institutional model. The announcement does not specify the number of judges, the required electoral majority or transitional arrangements. General PSL support is not equated with endorsement of every part of the Ujazdowski, Konfederacja or other proposals.
Following his meeting with the president on 31 October 2026, Szymon Hołownia reported discussions of possible ways out of the impasse. He stressed the need for further political work and expressed hope that both the president and governing camp would be willing to reach agreement.
What to keep in mind
Willingness to talk is not endorsement of a particular bill. The cited remarks give no reform parameters. They are not treated as an official decision by all of Polska 2050 to support a specific reset model.
KO, PiS and the Left are also described through their objections. The absence of their own model in the cited material does not justify attributing a proposal to them. Explore the positions →
02 / PROCEDURE
How can the Constitution be amended?
Article 235 establishes a separate procedure. A draft may be submitted by at least one-fifth of the statutory number of MPs (92), the Senate or the president. The first reading may take place no earlier than 30 days after submission.
The Sejm adopts the amendment by a majority of at least two-thirds, with at least half of its statutory membership present. The Senate has up to 60 days to adopt the identical text by an absolute majority, with the required quorum. The president signs it within 21 days and orders its publication.
Amendments to Chapters I, II or XII have additional requirements: at least 60 days between the first reading and adoption, and the possibility of an approving referendum at the request of authorised bodies. Article 194, concerning the Tribunal’s membership, is in Chapter VIII.
Move the slider to see the two-thirds threshold in the Sejm. This is an arithmetic model, not a forecast of support.
230460
at least307votes in favour
Assumption: everyone present casts a valid vote (for, against or abstaining). A separate quorum of 230 MPs applies. The Senate must adopt the same amendment by an absolute majority, with at least 50 senators present. Legal basis ↗
03 / WEIGHING THE ARGUMENTS
What could a reset achieve — and what can it not guarantee?
ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR
A chance to agree common rules
A constitutional amendment could provide an explicit basis for transitional provisions instead of relying solely on resolutions and competing interpretations.
Sharing appointments, qualified majorities and political cooling-off periods aim to make domination by one parliamentary majority harder.
In Ujazdowski’s model, giving the Tribunal president responsibility for publication addresses the problem of blocked judgments.
These are aims and anticipated effects, not certain outcomes.
KO raises the risk of abandoning accountability for earlier violations; PiS challenges removing people it regards as lawfully elected.
A higher majority requires agreement. A draft should explain what happens if no one is elected; Rozwój Plus proposes an additional presidential role in that situation.
The fate of earlier judgments and individuals’ cases must be addressed separately. Changing the membership does not itself answer every such question.
Effects on previous cases require separate transitional provisions.
Does a reset mean rewriting the entire Constitution?
Not necessarily. The Senate draft discussed here concerns selected provisions relating to the Tribunal. Any broader changes should be assessed from the specific text, not the label alone. Draft No. 55 ↗
Would a Sejm resolution be enough?
A resolution cannot replace the constitutional amendment procedure in Article 235. Article 194 currently provides for 15 Tribunal judges and nine-year terms. Changing those rules requires an appropriate constitutional amendment. The Constitution ↗
Would a reset automatically invalidate earlier judgments?
That should not be assumed. Effects on earlier judgments would depend on the provisions adopted and their relationship with other legal safeguards. Article 190 currently regulates the force and effects of Tribunal judgments. Article 190 ↗
Are 307 votes always necessary?
307 is the two-thirds threshold when 460 valid votes are cast. The threshold changes with fewer voters, but at least 230 MPs must still be present. The slider above is a simplified model assuming everyone present casts a valid vote. Article 235 ↗